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I. INTRODUCTION
The most controversial and significant development during the
past year was the enactment of the Tort Reform Law.' In addition to
modifying the substantive standards and procedures for the award of
punitive damages, the Tort Reform Law provides for a new offer of
judgment procedure. This procedure authorizes recovery of attorney
fees if an offer is rejected and the final judgment is less favorable than
the offer to the party who rejected it.2
There were also a number of important and interesting cases de-
cided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court and Oklahoma Courts of Ap-
peals relating to civil procedure. Three cases during the past year
were concerned with arbitrations, which may increasingly provide an
alternative forum for dispute resolution.3 In one interesting case,4 a
trial judge attempted to transfer a case to another district on forum
non conveniens grounds on his own motion, but the Supreme Court
t Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; Chair, Civil Procedure Com-
mittee, Oklahoma Bar Association, 1995-96.
1. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
2. Id.
3. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996); Carris v. John R.
Thomas & Assoc., 896 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1995); Southern Okla. Health Care v. JHBR-Jones-Hes-
ter-Bates-Riek, Inc., 900 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
4. Stevens v. Blevins, 890 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1995).
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issued a writ of prohibition to prevent him from doing so.5 In addi-
tion, there were several cases involving statutes of limitations. There
were also a number of cases involving appellate procedure in which
the Oklahoma Supreme Court continued to rule that a court's minute
order does not trigger the time for filing an appeal, even though the
order is signed by the trial judge.
II. TORT REFORM
The Tort Reform Law6 was the product of a compromise negoti-
ated between two opposing groups - the Citizens Against Lawsuit
Abuse and the Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association. What sparked
the compromise was the threat of an initiative petition on tort reform
that would have included graduated limits on attorneys' contingency
fees. These limits would have restricted all costs and expenses, includ-
ing attorney fees, to 33-1/3% of the first $100,000 of the recovery, with
the amount of costs and expenses being reduced on amounts over
$100,000 to as low as 10%.
The Tort Reform Law has three parts: 1) an offer of judgment
procedure;7 2) a three-tier system for punitive damages;8 and 3) im-
munity from tort liability for volunteers. 9 It also includes transition
provisions, stating that the Law applies only to cases filed after Sep-
tember 1, 1995, and not to cases that were pending on that date. 10
Part of the compromise that was reached is not found in the Law, but
instead is in the form of a letter from Governor Keating to the
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem. of the Senate prom-
ising a moratorium on other tort reform for the remainder of the Gov-
ernor's term.
The new offer of judgment statute, which is being codified at sec-
tion 1101.1 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes, has some similarity to
the offer of judgment provision in section 1101 of title 12,11 which has
never been amended since its adoption in 1910. Both procedures may
be initiated only by a defendant and provide that before the trial, the
defendant may make an offer for judgment to be taken against the
defendant for a specified amount. If the plaintiff does not accept the
5. Id. at 940.
6. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1 (Supp. 1995).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1 (Supp. 1995).
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31 (Supp. 1995).
10. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287, §§ 1(F), 2(G), 3(G).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101 (1991).
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offer and then proceeds to trial and recovers a judgment that is less
than the offer of judgment, the plaintiff will be liable for certain ex-
penses that the defendant incurred after the making of the offer of
judgment.' 2 The primary difference between the offer of judgment
provisions in sections 1101 and 1101.1 is that the expenses for which
the plaintiff is liable under section 1101 are the defendant's costs,
while the plaintiff is liable for the defendant's attorney fees in addi-
tion to costs under section 1101.1.
The new offer of judgment statute differentiates between per-
sonal injury, wrongful death, discrimination,'13 and retaliatory dis-
charge cases,' 4 which are governed by section 1101.1(A), and all other
types of actions, which are governed by section 1101.1(B). This dis-
tinction is important, because section 1101.1(A)(5) provides that the
offer of judgment procedure applies only if the plaintiff demands more
than $100,000 in a pleading or at trial, or the defendant makes an offer
of more than $100,000. Section 2008(A) of title 12' 5 prohibits a plain-
tiff from specifying in the petition the amount of damages in an action
not sounding in contract in which damages in excess of $10,000 are
being sought. Consequently, a plaintiff will never demand more than
$100,000 in a pleading in a personal injury, wrongful death, discrimi-
nation, or retaliatory discharge case in an Oklahoma state court. In
addition, a plaintiff is not required to specify the amount of damages
at trial, since section 2004(B) of title 1216 provides that the judgment
shall grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled, even if
that relief is not demanded in the pleadings. Therefore, a plaintiff can
avoid the application of section 1101.1 by not making a demand for
$100,000 at trial, unless the defendant makes an offer of judgment for
more than $100,000. The $100,000 limitation does not apply to the
business actions that are governed by section 1101.1(B).
If the offer of judgment procedure was intended to weed out friv-
olous tort cases, it is apparent that it will not succeed, because the
procedure will apply only if the defendant makes an offer of judgment
for more than $100,000. Obviously, no defendant would offer
$100,000 to settle a frivolous case.
As under the prior offer of judgment procedure in section 1101,
only a defendant may initiate the new offer of judgment procedure in
12. Id.
13. Under OLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1101-18 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
14. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (1991).
15. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2008(A)(2) (1991).
16. Id. at § 2004(B).
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section 1101.1 by filing an offer of judgment with the court.1 7 In con-
trast to the prior procedure, though, once the new offer of judgment
process is initiated, the plaintiff may make a counteroffer, and the de-
fendant may be liable for attorney fees to the plaintiff for not ac-
cepting the counteroffer if the eventual judgment is greater than the
counteroffer.18 Evidence that an offer or counteroffer was made is not
admissible to prove liability or damages, but only for the purposes of
awarding reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees.19
An offer of judgment is deemed to include any costs or attorney
fees that are otherwise recoverable.2 0 Also, the offer has to be filed at
least ten days before trial 1 The plaintiff in turn has ten days in which
to accept or reject the offer, or else file a counteroffer.2 2 If the plain-
tiff files a counteroffer, the defendant has ten days to accept or reject
it.23
If the plaintiff rejects, or does not accept the defendant's offer,
and the plaintiff eventually recovers a judgment that is less than the
defendant's final offer, then the defendant is entitled to reasonable
litigation costs and attorney fees that the defendant incurred after
making the offer.24 Although the term "reasonable litigation costs" is
not defined in the statute, it could easily be construed to include ex-
penses beyond those listed in section 942 of title 12 of the Oklahoma
Statutes,25 such as expert witness fees.
An apparent inconsistency in the new statute is that section
1101.1(A)(1) states that the defendant's offer is deemed to include
costs and attorney fees that are otherwise recoverable, but under sec-
tion 1101.1(A)(3), the judgment is exclusive of costs and attorney fees
that are otherwise recoverable. Thus, deciding whether the plaintiff is
liable for reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees requires com-
paring apples to oranges, because the offer of judgment is deemed to
include costs and attorney fees, while the judgment does not. For ex-
ample, if the defendant makes an offer of $200,000, which includes
$30,000 in costs and attorney fees that are otherwise recoverable, and
the plaintiff obtains a judgment for $220,000 of which $30,000 is costs
17. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(1).
18. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(4).
19. Id. at § 1101.1(C).
20. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(4).
21. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(1).
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(2).
24. I& at § 1101.1(A)(3).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 942 (1991).
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and attorney fees that are otherwise recoverable, the plaintiff would
be liable for reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees under a lit-
eral reading of the statute, even though the plaintiff in fact recovered
$20,000 more than the defendant offered.
An interesting feature of the new statute is that a defendant who
is entitled to reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees may offset
them against the plaintiff's judgment.26 However, the plaintiff's attor-
ney has priority for any attorney's lien not exceeding 25% of the judg-
ment and for recovery of reasonable litigation costs not exceeding
15% of the judgment.
The offer of judgment procedure for cases other than personal
injury, wrongful death, discrimination, and retaliatory discharge cases
is found in section 1101.1(B). As noted previously, the main differ-
ence between the offer of judgment procedure for personal injury and
the procedure for other cases is that there is no $100,000 offer require-
ment for the other cases.28 The other differences are rather confusing
and probably of limited practical significance. In personal injury
cases, a defendant will be entitled to an award of reasonable litigation
costs and attorney fees incurred from the time of filing of the final
offer of judgment until the judgment.29 In the other actions, though, a
defendant will be entitled to an award of reasonable litigation costs
and attorney fees that were incurred between the time of the filing of
the first offer of judgment that is larger than the judgment and the
judgment. For example, the defendant might make 3 offers: $50,000;
$100,000; and $200,000, which are all rejected. If the plaintiff eventu-
ally obtains a judgment for $75,000, then the defendant is entitled to
reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees from the date of the sec-
ond offer for $100,000, rather than from the date of the last offer for
$200,000.
Another difference between sections 1101.1(A) and 1101.1(B) is
that section 1101.1(B) specifies that it is possible for both the plaintiff
and defendant to be entitled to an award of reasonable litigation costs
and attorney fees, and if so, they can offset each other. This may hap-
pen if the defendant starts with a high offer that is rejected and then
makes a lower offer later. For example, the defendant might make an
offer of $200,000 initially, which the plaintiff rejects. Then right
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(A)(3) (Supp. 1995).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at § 1101.1(A)(3).
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before trial the defendant offers $50,000, and the plaintiff counterof-
fers $125,000, which the defendant now rejects. If the plaintiff recov-
ers a judgment for $150,000 the defendant would be entitled to an
award of reasonable litigation costs and attorney fees from the date of
the initial $200,000 offer, and the plaintiff would be entitled to reason-
able litigation costs and attorney fees from the date of the $125,000
offer. However, most negotiations do not begin with high offers and
then go lower.
It remains to be seen how much this new offer of judgment provi-
sion will be used. The previous procedure in section 1101 does not
appear to have been used a great deal, judging by the small number of
reported decisions listed under the section in the Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated. ° The availability of attorney fees may increase the use of
the offer of judgment procedure somewhat, but other states with simi-
lar procedures, such as Florida,3' Indiana,32 and Nevada,33 did not see
a deluge of offers of judgment after their statutes were adopted.
Moreover, the $100,000 offer requirement can be expected to drasti-
cally restrict its use in personal injury cases. Another factor that may
reduce the use of the offer of judgment procedure is that while the
process can be initiated only by a defendant, the defendant may be
reluctant to do so, because once the defendant starts the process, the
plaintiff can then respond with a counteroffer that will put pressure on
the defendant to settle. Initiating the process may therefore be a two-
edged sword from the defendant's perspective.
The new punitive damages statute is being codified at section 9.1
of title 23 of the Oklahoma Statutes and replaces section 9 of title 23,
which has been repealed. 4 Under the prior statute, punitive damages
were limited to the amount of actual damages, unless the trial judge
decided there was clear and convincing evidence of "wanton or reck-
less disregard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud or malice,
actual or presumed .... ,3- If so, the judge could lift the cap on
punitives, and this led to a few large punitive awards, the most notori-
ous of which was a $10 million award described in Scribner v. Hillcrest
Medical Center.36
30. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1101 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
31. FLA. STAT. ch. § 45.061 (1990).
32. IND. CODE § 34-4-44.6.9 (1986).
33. NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.115 (1991).
34. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287, § 4.
35. OxLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991) (repealed 1995).
36. 866 P.2d 437,440,446 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (judgment affirmed conditioned on remitti-
tur of punitive damages to $5 million).
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The major change made by the adoption of the new punitive
damages statute is the division of punitive damages awards into the
following three categories: Category I) where the defendant was guilty
of reckless disregard of the rights of others; Category II) where the
defendant acted intentionally and with malice towards others; and
Category III) where the defendant acted intentionally and with malice
towards others and also "engaged in conduct life-threatening to
humans. 37
Under the prior law,38 the trial judge determined whether to lift
the cap on punitive damages. In contrast to the prior law, the decision
of whether a case falls into Category I or II is now made by the jury,
which must make particular findings by clear and convincing evidence
in a separate proceeding before determining whether to award puni-
tive damages and their amount.39 In order for a case to come under
Category III, both the judge and the jury must make particular find-
ings before the jury determines whether to award punitive damages
and their amount.40
Category I requires a finding by the jury of clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the rights of
others or an insurer recklessly disregarded its duty to deal fairly and
act in good faith with its insured. In this Category, punitive damages
are limited to the greater of $100,000, or the actual damages
awarded. 4 1 The statute does not define "reckless disregard," but the
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions supply the following definition:
The conduct of [Defendant] was in wanton or reckless disregard of
another's rights if [Defendant] was either aware, or did not care,
that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his/her/its]
conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the con-
duct to be in wanton or reckless disregard of another's rights, it
must have been unreasonable under the circumstances, and also
there must have been a high probability that the conduct would
cause serious harm to another person.42
Category II is probably the most important of the three catego-
ries. It requires a finding by the jury of clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice towards others
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(D)(2) (Supp. 1995).
38. OKiA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991) (repealed 1995).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(B),(C) (Supp. 1995).
40. Id. at § 9.1(D).
41. Id. at § 9.1(B).
42. Oklahoma Supreme Court Committee for Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, Oklahoma
Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil (2d ed. 1993).
1996]
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or that an insurer intentionally and with malice breached its duty to
deal fairly and act in good faith with its insured.43 Again, the statute
does not define "malice," but the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions supply the following definition: "Malice involves either hatred,
spite, or ill-will, or else the doing of a wrongful act intentionally with-
out just cause or excuse.""4 In this Category, punitive damages are
limited to the greater of $500,000, twice the amount of actual dam-
ages, or the increased financial benefit that the defendant or insurer
derived as a direct result of the conduct causing the injury to the plain-
tiff and other persons or entities.45 The last measure concerning the
financial benefit to the defendant is subject to reduction by the
amount that the defendant has already paid in punitive damages in
Oklahoma state court actions to other defendants on account of the
same conduct.46 No reduction is authorized, however, for punitive
damages awards in federal courts or the courts of other jurisdictions.4 7
This last measure in Category II is entirely new. Basing the puni-
tive damages award on the defendant's financial benefits could pro-
duce enormous exposure for a defendant, especially in a products
liability case. Consider, for example, the famous case against McDon-
ald's Corporation for injuries to a plaintiff who suffered serious burns
from hot coffee that she was served.48 Because of the large exposure
under this last measure, a determination that a case comes under Cat-
egory II may have nearly the same effect, as a practical matter, as the
judge's lifting the cap under prior law. Of great benefit to the plain-
tiff, however, is that the determination is made by the jury, instead of
the judge.
Category III is characterized by no limits on punitive damages.
As in Category II, the jury has to find by clear and convincing evi-
dence in a separate proceeding that the defendant acted intentionally
and with malice towards others or an insurer intentionally and with
malice breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insured.4 9 In addition, though, the judge must find there is evidence
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(C) (Supp. 1995).
44. Oklahoma Supreme Court Committee for Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, Oklahoma
Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil (2d ed. 1993).
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(C) (Supp. 1995).
46. 1d.
47. Id.
48. Judge Reduces Award in Coffee Scalding Case; From $2.7 Million to $480,000, THm
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 1994, at 3.
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(D) (Supp. 1995).
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or insurer acted inten-
tionally and with malice and engaged in conduct life-threatening to
humans.50 Only if the appropriate findings are made by both the
judge and the jury, may the judge lift the cap on punitives.
Once the appropriate Category has been selected, the jury must
then determine the amount of punitive damages in a separate pro-
ceeding. In contrast to the prior statute, the new statute lists a
number of factors to govern the award of punitive damages. These
are:
[T]he seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the de-
fendant's misconduct; the profitability of the misconduct to the de-
fendant; the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its
excessiveness; the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon dis-
covery of the misconduct or hazard; in the case of a defendant
which is a corporation or other entity, the number and level of em-
ployees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct; and the
financial condition of the defendant."1
The bifurcation of the award of punitive damages into one phase
for determining the appropriate Category and another phase for the
amount of the award is significant because the defendant's financial
condition would not be relevant to the determination of either the
defendant's liability or the Category, although it would be relevant to
the amount of the award. Thus, evidence of the defendant's net worth
would not be admissible until after actual damages had been awarded
and the jury had determined the appropriate category based on the
defendant's conduct. It also appears that information concerning a
defendant's financial worth would not be discoverable until the jury
had decided that the defendant was liable for punitive damages.52
In some ways, the new statute is more restrictive with respect to
punitive damages than the prior statute, but punitive damages may
also be greater in many circumstances under the new statute than they
would have been under the prior statute. As noted above,5 3 the most
obvious difference between the two statutes is that the new statute has
three categories for punitive damages,54 while the prior statute had
only two. Under the prior statute, punitive damages were limited to
50. Id. at § 9.1(D)(2).
51. OrIA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(A) (Supp. 1995).
52. See Cox v. Theus, 569 P.2d 447, 450 (Okla. 1977) (abuse of discretion for trial court to
order production of defendant's financial records before trial).
53. See supra text accompanying note 38.
54. Ox.iA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(B),(C),(D) (Supp. 1995).
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actual damages, unless the trial judge lifted the cap, in which case they
were unlimited.55 Punitive damages are not unrestricted under the
new statute unless both the judge and jury make the appropriate find-
ings to place the case into Category I1.56
Another difference is in the standard of proof required for an
award of punitive damages. Under the prior statute, a jury was au-
thorized to award punitive damages up to the amount of actual dam-
ages if it found by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant
guilty of reckless disregard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud,
or malice.57 In contrast, under the new statute, the jury must find by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of reck-
less disregard for the rights of others before it can award punitive
damages.5 Once the jury finds reckless disregard by clear and con-
vincing evidence, though, it may award the greater of $100,000 or the
amount of actual damages;59 under the prior statute, the punitive
damages award was limited to the amount of actual damages.60 In a
case where the jury could find reckless disregard by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, but the judge would not, and the amount of actual dam-
ages was less than $100,000, a punitive damages award could be higher
under the new statute than it could under the prior statute.
A punitive damages award could also be higher under the new
statute in a case where the jury could find by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice to-
wards others, but the judge would not find reckless disregard by clear
and convincing evidence. Instead of being limited to the amount of
actual damages, the jury could award punitive damages in such a case
up to the greater of $500,000, twice the actual damages, or the amount
of the increased financial benefit that the defendant derived as a di-
rect result of its conduct. 61 As a practical matter, a jury that is unable
to find clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard or inten-
tional conduct and malice would be unlikely to award significant puni-
tive damages. Thus, the restrictions in Categories I and II may be
more apparent than real in many cases, and as a result, there may well
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991) (repealed 1995).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(D) (Supp. 1995).
57. OK.A. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991) (repealed 1995).
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (Supp. 1995).
59. ld.
60. OKL.A. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991) (repealed 1995).
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (Supp. 1995).
[Vol. 31:753
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be more punitive damages awards that are greater than actual dam-
ages under the new statute than there were under the prior statute.
The third part of the Tort Reform Law provides immunity from
liability for volunteers, but only if they were acting within the scope of
their duties for a charitable or not-for-profit corporation.62 The stat-
ute also provides that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies so
that, while the volunteer may have immunity, the plaintiff is allowed
to recover from the volunteer's employer.63 Since a plaintiff will ordi-
narily be looking to the employer for compensation, the immunity
that the statute confers on the volunteer is unlikely to have any signifi-
cant effect.
Besides the enactment of the Tort Reform Law, there were a
number of appellate decisions relating to civil procedure. These are
the subject of the remainder of this paper.
IIL PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
There were a number of decisions involving statutes of limitations
during the past year.' 4 Another case ruled that a trial judge could not
transfer a case on forum non conveniens grounds upon his own mo-
tion.65 There were also several decisions involving issues under the
Oklahoma Pleading Code, such as the amendment of pleadings,66 the
assertion of third-party claims,67 and real parties in interest issues.
One statutory change was the amendment to section 1751 of title
12 of the Oklahoma Statutes,68 which expanded the jurisdictional lim-
its for small claims courts to $4500 from $2500.69 Another statutory
development that related to discovery was the amendment to section
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(A) (Supp. 1995).
63. Id. at § 31(B).
64. Cruse v. Atoka County Bd. of Comm'rs, 910 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1996); Stephens v. General
Motors Corp., 905 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1995); Resolution Trust Co. v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807 (Okla.
1995); Marshall v. Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, 899 P.2d 621 (Okla. 1995); Weathers v.
Fulgenzi, 884 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1994); Dennis v. City of Chickasha, 898 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App.
1995); Bruce v. Employers Casualty Co., 897 P.2d 313 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Randolph v.
Oklahoma Military Dep't, 895 P.2d 736 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Ranier v. Stuart & Freida, P.C.,
887 P.2d 339 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
65. Stevens v. Blevins, 890 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1995).
66. Dotson v. Rainbolt, 894 P.2d 1109 (Okla. 1995); Bray v. Thomas Energy Sys., Inc., 909
P.2d 1191 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Nealis v. Knight, 901 P.2d 228 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Sedbrook
v. Rouse, 894 P.2d 435 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Stotts v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 882 P.2d 1106 (Okla. Ct. App.
1994).
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1751 (Supp. 1995).
69. See 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 136.
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3228 of the Oklahoma Discovery Code70 authorizing trial courts to
issue commissions and letters rogatory in connection with the taking
of depositions in other states.71 Before this amendment, commissions
and letters rogatory had been limited to depositions in foreign
countries.
In Cruse v. Atoka County Board of Commissioners,72 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether Oklahoma's
savings statute at section 100 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes73
was applicable to cases filed under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort
Claims Act. The plaintiffs submitted a timely claim, and after it was
deemed denied they fied a timely action against the Board of Com-
missioners of Atoka County.74 After the Board filed a motion for
summary judgment but before the court ruled on the motion, the
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice to refil-
ing.75 When the plaintiffs refied their action, the Board moved to
dismiss on the ground that the second action was barred because it
was not filed within the 180-day period provided for in the Tort
Claims Act.76 The plaintiffs argued that Oklahoma's savings statute
extended the time for .them to file a new action for one year after the
dismissal of their earlier action.77 The trial court dismissed the second
action and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reversed.78 The Supreme Court rejected the Board's argument
that the 180-day time limitation in the Tort Claims Act was a condi-
tion upon the plaintiffs' right to bring an action under the Act, rather
than a true statute of limitations to which section 100 would apply.79
Instead, it ruled that, in the absence of legislative intent to the con-
trary, section 100 was as applicable to a tort claim against a political
subdivision as a tort claim against any other defendant.80 Cruse over-
ruled three recent Court of Appeals decisions8 l to the contrary.
70. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3228 (Supp. 1995).
71. See 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 253, § 5.
72. 910 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1996).
73. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
74. Cruse, 910 P.2d at 999.
75. Id.
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 157(B) (1991).
77. Cruse, 910 P.2d at 1000.
78. Id. at 1005.
79. Id. at 1004.
80. Id. at 1005.
81. Gibson v. City of Tblsa, 880 P.2d 429 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Robbins v. City of Del City,
875 P.2d 1170 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Ceasar v. City of TIsa, 861 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
For analysis of these cases, see Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law-
Civil Procedure, 30 TULSA L.J. 485, 490-91 (1995).
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Dennis v. City of Chickasha,' involved the limitations period in
the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act,83 which requires an ac-
tion to be commenced within 180 days after a claim has been denied,
or deemed denied by the municipality's failure to approve the claim
within ninety days. The Court of Appeals held that fundamental no-
tions of due process required the sending of notice of the denial of the
claim to the claimant in order for the 180 day period to begin. In
1994, the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act,' 4 was amended
to add an express requirement for giving written notice to the
claimant.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court examined the discovery rule for
accrual of medical malpractice claims in Weathers v. Fulgenzi.ss Fol-
lowing precedent such as Lovelace v. Keohane,8 6 the Supreme Court
held that under the discovery rule, an action for medical malpractice
accrued when the plaintiff became aware of her injury, and that the
statute of limitations required the plaintiff to pursue her claim with
reasonable diligence after she became aware of the injury.87
Marshall v. Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon,8 8 Ranier v. Stuart &
Freida, P.C.,8 9 and Stephens v. General Motors Corp.90 were con-
cerned with the accrual of legal malpractice claims. In these cases, the
courts required that the fact (although not the amount) of the injury
must be ascertained with certainty before the claim accrues and the
limitations period begins to run.91 In the Marshall case, the Supreme
Court held that the claim of an administrator of a guardianship against
his attorney did not accrue until after the administrator had been dis-
charged and the newly appointed guardian filed suit against the for-
mer administrator to surcharge him on his guardianship bond.' It
decided that even though the former administrator may have been
aware of the attorney's negligence before, he did not suffer any dam-
ages until the newly appointed administrator filed suit against him.9 3
82. 898 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 157(B) (1991).
84. Id. at § 157(A).
85. 884 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1994).
86. 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992).
87. Weathers, 884 P.2d at 542.
88. 899 P.2d 621 (Okla. 1995).
89. 887 P.2d 339 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
90. 905 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1995).
91. See Marshall, 899 P.2d at 623; Ranier, 887 P.2d at 343; Stephens, 905 P.2d at 800.
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Marshall was followed in Stephens v. General Motors Corp.94 After
summary judgment was granted against the plaintiff on the grounds
that her action was barred by the statute of limitations, she filed a
legal malpractice action against her attorney.95 The trial court ruled
that the malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations
because more than two years had passed since the granting of the mo-
tion for summary judgment.96 The Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal and the petition for
rehearing was denied.97
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held in the Ranier case that a
client's claim for legal malpractice that arose out of an attorney's rep-
resentation of him in a previous case did not accrue until the previous
case was finally resolved on appeal, at least if there was no indication
that the client was aware of any harm suffered before the appeal was
decided.98
The Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed the doctrine of adverse
domination as a means of tolling a statute of limitations in Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Grant.99 After the Resolution Trust Corporation was
appointed the receiver of a failed savings and loan association, it filed
a federal court action against a number of the association's former
directors.100 The directors moved to dismiss on statute of limitations
grounds, and the federal court certified questions to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court concerning whether the statutes of limitations should
be tolled during the period that the directors controlled the corpora-
tion.1' 1 The Supreme Court analogized the tolling issue to
Oklahoma's discovery rule, under which a tort action is tolled until
the injured party knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have known of the injury. 0 2 Like the discovery rule, the ad-
verse domination doctrine arises out of the inability of a party to
know of an injury or its cause. As long as the wrongdoing directors
are in control of a corporation, the corporation is prevented from as-
serting a claim against them, and it is only when a new entity, such as a
94. 905 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1995).
95. Id. at 798.
96. Id.
97. Stephens, 905 P.2d at 800.
98. Ranier, 887 P.2d at 343.
99. 901 P.2d 807 (Okla. 1995).
100. Id. at 809.
101. Id. at 809-10.
102. Id. at 813.
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receiver, takes control, that suit can be filed against the wrongdoers.
While recognizing the adverse domination doctrine, the Supreme
Court cautiously limited its scope to situations involving fraudulent
conduct while the corporation was controlled by a majority of culpa-
ble directors and officers. 10 3
The Court of Appeals considered the application of equitable es-
toppel to assert the statute of limitations in Randolph v. Oklahoma
Military Department.10 4 It held that for equitable estoppel to apply, a
defendant must: 1) lull the plaintiff into delaying the filing of suit
through assurance of settlement negotiations, 2) make express and re-
peated admissions of liability with promises of settlement, or 3) en-
gage in fraud or concealment to induce the plaintiff to delay bringing
the action.10 5 Since none of these grounds were shown, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the suit as time-
barred. 10 6
Bruce v. Employers Casualty Co.10 7 involved an unusual issue:
whether the court clerk's filing stamp was determinative of the date of
the filing of an action. The plaintiff sent her petition to the court
clerk's office by certified mail three days before the statute of limita-
tions expired.'0 On the following day, the post office left notice with
the court clerk that the certified mail was at the post office, and the
court clerk signed for the certified mail the next day, one day before
the statute of limitations ran.'0 9 However, the court clerk's file stamp
showed a date of receipt three days after the statute of limitations
expired."10 The Court of Appeals held that this evidence created an
issue of fact as to whether the action had been timely commenced,
which precluded a summary judgment."'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's sua
sponte transfer of a case on forum non conveniens grounds in Stevens
v. Blevins."2 The case arose out of an injury on a go-cart at a recrea-
tion center in Kingfisher County." 3 The plaintiff filed a negligence
103. Id. at 819.
104. 895 P.2d 736 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
105. Id. at 739 (following Jarvis v. City of Stillwater, 832 P.2d 470 (Okla. 1987)).
106. Id. at 739.
107. 897 P.2d 313 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).




112. 890 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1995).
113. Id. at 937.
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and products liability action in Oklahoma County against the recrea-
tion center as well as the seller and manufacturer of the go-cart. 114
Venue was proper in Oklahoma County, because the seller of the go-
cart was located there. Although the defendant did not seek a trans-
fer, the trial court ordered the case transferred on forum non con-
veniens grounds to Kingfisher County, which was where the injury
occurred. 115 The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to pre-
vent the transfer, holding that a trial judge does not have authority to
alter a plaintiff's choice of venue unless venue is improper, the plain-
tiff's choice violates the Oklahoma Constitution, or there is a motion
for transfer on forum non conveniens grounds or under section 140 of
title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes." 6
Several cases concerned the amendment of pleadings under sec-
tion 2015 of title 12.117 In Sedbrook v. Rouse,"8s the Court of Appeals
applied the rule that once a responsive pleading is served, leave of
court or written consent of the defendant is required for an amend-
ment. 1 9 Since neither leave of court nor the defendant's consent was
obtained, the plaintiff's purported amendment naming additional de-
fendants was a nullity.' 20 When the plaintiff attempted to file a new
action against these additional defendants, the trial court dismissed it
on statute of limitations grounds and the Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 2 ' The plaintiff argued that Oklahoma's savings statute 22 al-
lowed a new action to be filed within one year of the dismissal of an
action other than on its merits.' 3 The Court of Appeals decided,
however, that section 100 was not available to the plaintiff since the
purported amendment naming the additional defendants was a nullity
and therefore was not a timely commencement of an action against
them."  In Nealis v. Knecht,- 5 the Court of Appeals held that leave
to amend a petition should have been allowed where the amendment
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bruce, 890 P.2d at 938-40.
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2015 (Supp. 1994).
118. 894 P.2d 435 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
119. Id. at 438.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
123. Sedbrook, 894 P.2d at 438.
124. Id.
125. 901 P.2d 228 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
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concerned the same claim alleged in the original petition and did not
seek to add a new and different claim. 12 6
In Dotson v. Rainbolt,12 7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court deter-
mined that an amendment naming defendants who had originally
been named as John Does did not relate back to the filing of the peti-
tion for statute of limitations purposes, because the plaintiff knew the
identities of the defendants before the statute of limitations ran. 28
The plaintiff argued that the amendment should relate back because
she did not learn that the defendants were liable to her until shortly
before she filed the amended petition. 29 The Supreme Court relied
on the language in section 2015(C) of title 12 that "but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him"'3 ° to hold that the plaintiff's lack of knowl-
edge must relate to the identity, rather than the culpability, of the new
defendants. 3 '
Dotson was followed by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Bray
v. Energy Systems, Inc.132 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision denying the relation back of an amendment to add
new defendants, whose identities were available to the plaintiff before
the statute of limitations ran and the plaintiff failed to offer any reason
why the defendants were not included in the action before expiration
of the statute of limitations.3 3
The Court of Appeals analyzed impleader procedure under sec-
tion 2014 of title 12'13 in Stotts v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints.'35 In a negligence action arising out of an auto accident, the
defendants filed a third-party petition seeking contribution against a
construction company and a sign company, alleging negligence by the
third-parties in warning motorists about construction on the street
where the accident occurred. 36 The trial court dismissed the third-
party petition on the grounds that impleader was not available be-
cause the defendants had denied liability to the plaintiff, but the Court
126. Id. at 231.
127. 894 P.2d 1109 (Okla. 1995).
128. Id. at 1113.
129. Id.
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2015(C) (Supp. 1995).
131. Dotson, 894 P.2d at 1113.
132. 909 P.2d 1191 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
133. Id. at 1196.
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2014 (1991).
135. 882 P.2d 1106 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
136. Id. at 1107.
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of Appeals reversed, holding that inconsistency in pleading was per-
mitted under the Oklahoma Pleading Code.137 It also ruled that a
contingent third-party claim for contribution could be asserted before
the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was decided.138
Two Court of Appeals cases dealt with real parties in interest is-
sues under title 12, section 2017 of the Oklahoma Statutes. In Musko-
gee Title Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,139 the Court of
Appeals decided that both a partially subrogated insurer and its in-
sured may join as co-plaintiffs in an action to recover the entire loss
from a third party.140 Alternatively, an insured may bring a claim on
its own to recover for its loss as the real party in interest; however, a
partially subrogated insurer may not maintain an action on its own.' 41
The Court of Appeals also decided in Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co.142
that if an action is inadvertently brought by an improper party, the
trial court should allow a reasonable opportunity for substitution of
the proper party as the real party in interest instead of dismissing the
action.143
The next section of this Article examines a number of appellate
decisions dealing with trials. It also discusses several cases that were
concerned with arbitration and the settlement of cases.
IV. TRIAL PROCEDURE, ARBITRATIONS, AND SETrLEMENT
The appellate courts in Oklahoma decided several cases involving
trial procedure in 1995. 44 Parrish v. Lilly145 was concerned with chal-
lenges of jurors for cause. Crussel v. Kirk146 allowed the use of a re-
buttal witness who was not listed in the pretrial order. In Propst v.
Alexander,47 the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed great defer-
ence to the trial court's discretion in reviewing orders granting new
trials. The increasing importance of alternative dispute resolution was
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 894 P.2d 1148 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
140. Id. at 1150.
141. Id.
142. 895 P.2d 731 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
143. Id. at 733.
144. Propst v. Alexander, 898 P.2d 141 (Okla. 1995); Crussel v. Kirk, 894 P.2d 1116 (Okla.
1995); Parrish v. Lilly, 883 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1993).
145. 883 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1993).
146. 894 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1995).
147. 898 P.2d 141 (Okla. 1995).
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reflected by a number of decisions involving arbitration 148 and settle-
ment.149 Of special importance in light of the new offer of judgment
process in the Tort Reform Law are three Court of Appeals deci-
sions150 concerned with the previous offer of judgment procedure in
section 1101 of title 12.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to dismiss a juror for cause in Parrish v.
Lilly.'' The Parrish case was a medical malpractice action alleging
that the defendant doctor was negligent in failing to diagnose and
treat the decedent's lung cancer. 152 During voir dire, the prospective
jurors on the panel were asked about their reactions to probable trial
testimony that the decedent had smoked a pack of cigarettes a day for
over forty years. 53 After the jurors were selected and sworn, one of
the jurors expressed concern about his impartiality both orally in open
court and in a note to the judge that said he had already formed an
opinion from the evidence of the decedent's smoking. 5 4 The judge
summoned the juror to his chambers and explained that no evidence
had yet been introduced. 55 The discussion ended with the juror stat-
ing that he could impartially judge the evidence after it was intro-
duced.' 56 The plaintiffs then moved to strike the juror and replace
him with the alternate juror, but the defense counsel resisted because
he did not like the alternate, and the trial judge denied the motion.'57
Following a unanimous defense verdict, the plaintiffs appealed.' 58 The
Supreme Court determined that the record showed the juror to have
had an opinion that hampered his ability to render an unbiased ver-
dict, and it decided that under the circumstances, doubt as to the ju-
ror's impartiality should have been resolved in the plaintiffs' favor.'59
The Supreme Court also ruled that the trial court's error in refusing to
148. Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996); Cards v. John R.
Thomas & Assocs., P.C., 896 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1995); Southern Okla. Health Care v. Jones, Hes-
ter, Bates, Rick, Inc., 900 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995); Goldman v. Goldman, 883
P.2d 164 (Okla. 1994).
150. Gaston v. illery, 900 P.2d 1012 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Allison v. City of El Reno, 894
P.2d 1133 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Hernandez v. United Supermarkets of Okla., Inc., 882 P.2d 84
(Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
151. 883 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1993).




156. Id. at 160.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 161.
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dismiss the juror was not harmless, despite the fact that only nine ju-
rors were needed to reach a verdict. 60 It held that even though only
nine concurring jurors are required to render a verdict, all of the ju-
rors are required to be qualified and impartial.161
In Crussel v. Kirk,162 the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the
use of rebuttal witness testimony and the limitations on a lawyer testi-
fying as a witness.163 The trial judge refused to permit an attorney
who was the plaintiff's counsel of record to testify as a rebuttal witness
concerning a prior inconsistent statement of an opposing witness.1 64
Even though the attorney was not listed as a witness in the pretrial
order, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred because the
attorney's testimony was critical to assessing the veracity of the oppos-
ing witness. The Supreme Court first determined that a rebuttal wit-
ness does not need to be listed on a pretrial order in order to testify to
a prior inconsistent statement of an opposing witness. A rebuttal wit-
ness differs from other witnesses in that the testimony of the rebuttal
witness depends on the testimony from the opposing witness who is
sought to be impeached by the rebuttal witness. To require an attor-
ney to list every potential rebuttal witness on a pretrial order would
require him to anticipate fully the testimony of each opposing wit-
ness.' 65 This would not only be impractical in many cases, but it
would also undermine the usefulness of rebuttal witnesses by eliminat-
ing the element of surprise.
The Supreme Court next addressed whether an attorney should
be permitted to testify in a case where he is counsel of record. 66 The
Supreme Court held that Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct was limited to trial advocates.167 Although the attorney in the
Crussel case was the plaintiff's counsel of record, he did not act as an
advocate; instead, other attorneys from his firm presented arguments
and examined witnesses. 68 The Supreme Court therefore concluded
that the attorney was not precluded from testifying as a rebuttal
witness. 69
160. Id.
161. Id. at 162.
162. 894 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1995).
163. Id. at 1120.
164. Id. at 1121.
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In affirming the granting of a new trial in Propst v. Alexander,17 °
the Oklahoma Supreme Court emphasized the broad discretion given
to a trial judge: "The granting of a new trial will not be reversed on
appeal unless it is shown that the trial court materially and manifestly
erred beyond a reasonable doubt." '' The Supreme Court noted that
a stronger showing of error is required for reversal of an order grant-
ing a new trial than an order denying one.'72 The opposite rule
prevails in the federal courts.'7 3
In Clark v. Bearden,1 74 however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reversed a grant of new trial on the issue of damages only that was
based on the alleged misconduct of the defendant's attorney in a med-
ical malpractice case."5 The alleged misconduct occurred during voir
dire, when the defense counsel told the jury that the judge's husband
was a plaintiff's lawyer. 176 While recognizing that this statement was
improper, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that it did not warrant a
new trial in the absence of a showing that it prejudiced the jurors
against the plaintiff and resulted in an unreasonable verdict. 77
Three appellate decisions were concerned with arbitrations. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arbitration
clauses in contracts in Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc.17s Af-
ter one party to a contract fied a declaratory judgment action, the
other party moved for an order compelling arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration clause in the contract.179 The trial court denied the motion
on the ground that the arbitration clause violated the access-to-court
provision in article 2, section 6180 of the Oklahoma Constitution.''
170. 898 P.2d 141 (Okla. 1995).
171. Id. at 147.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310 (7th Cir. 1995).
174. 903 P.2d 309 (Okla. 1995).
175. Id. at 309.
176. Id. at 311.
177. Id. at 312.
178. 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996).
179. Id. at 1031.
180. OKrLA. CONST., art. II, § 6 provides:
The courts of justice of the state shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain
remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputa-
tion; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.
181. OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 8 provides:
Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by which any of
the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void.
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The Supreme Court reversed."s It noted that arbitration is author-
ized under the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act,183 and the Uni-
form Act includes provisions for the parties to obtain judicial review
of an award from an arbitration proceeding."& These provisions pro-
tect against unfairness and bias in the arbitration process, and the
Supreme Court concluded that they were sufficient "access to court"
to satisfy the requirements of article II, section 6.185 Accordingly, it
upheld the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the contract.' 86
Southern Oklahoma Health Care Corp. v. JHBR-Jones-Hester-
Bates-Riek, Inc., 8 involved the enforceability of an arbitration clause
in a contract for the renovation of a hospital. After the hospital
brought an action against the contractor, the contractor sought an or-
der directing arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration clause
in the contract. 18  The hospital challenged the arbitration clause as
violative of title 15, section 216 of the Oklahoma statutes and section
8, article 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution, but the Court of Appeals
decided that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the
clause was enforceable under Oklahoma law because it ruled that it
was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.'8 9 Relying on the
broad interpretation that the United States Supreme Court gave to
the Federal Arbitration Act in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v.
Dobson,190 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals determined that the con-
tract affected interstate commerce because goods and services from
outside Oklahoma were to be used in performing the contract, and
therefore it came within the Federal Arbitration Act.' 91
Carris v. John R. Thomas & Associates'9g dealt with the claim and
issue preclusion effects of an arbitration clause on subsequent litiga-
tion. The Carris case arose out of a construction dispute involving a
property owner, a contractor, and an architect. 193 Pursuant to an arbi-
tration clause in the contractor's contract with the property owner, the
182. Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1036.
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-18 (1991).
184. Id. at §§ 811-17,
185. Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1035-36.
186. Id. at 1031.
187. 900 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
188. Id. at 1019.
189. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
190. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
191. Southern Okla. Health Care, 900 P.2d at 1019.
192. 896 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1995).
193. Id. at 525.
[Vol. 31:753
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss4/4
OKLAHOMA CIVIL PROCEDURE
contractor proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded dam-
ages to both the contractor and the property owner.194 The contractor
then brought a negligence action against the architect, who moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the action was precluded by
the arbitration proceeding. 5 The Supreme Court held that neither
claim nor issue preclusion barred the negligence action against the ar-
chitect, because the architect could not have been made a party to the
arbitration proceeding and hence no relief was available in the arbi-
tration proceeding against the architect.' 96
The effect of settlements was the subject of two Oklahoma
Supreme Court decisions. In Goldman v. Goldman,197 the Supreme
Court refused a joint request of the parties to an appeal to withdraw a
Court of Appeals decision as a condition of settlement. In doing so,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court anticipated a similar ruling by the
United States Supreme Court in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bon-
ner Mall Partnership.'98 Moss v. City of Oklahoma City'99 involved
the effect on other tortfeasors of a release given to one tortfeasor.
Noting a three-way split of authority in other jurisdictions that had
considered the issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the spe-
cific identity rule, under which a general release will discharge poten-
tial tortfeasors who are not parties to the release from liability only if
they are expressly designated or otherwise specifically identified in the
release.2"0 Moss was followed in Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,2 ' an-
other case involving a general release that purported to release un-
named tortfeasors from liability.
Of particular interest because of the adoption of the new offer of
judgment procedure in the Tort Reform Law are several Court of Ap-
peals decisions involving the previous offer of judgment procedure in
title 12, section 1101 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Following the major-
ity of other jurisdictions that had considered the issue, the Court of
Appeals held in Hernandez v. United Supermarkets of Oklahoma,
Inc.2 °" that an offer of judgment is irrevocable for the period provided
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 530.
197. 883 P.2d 164 (Okla. 1994).
198. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
199. 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
200. Id. at 286.
201. 903 P.2d 878, 879 (Okla. 1995).
202. 882 P.2d 84 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
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by the statute for the plaintiff's response."0 3 This period is five days
for offers of judgment under section 1101 and ten days for offers of
judgment under section 1101.1. The same conclusion was reached by
a different panel of the Court of Appeals in Allison v. City of El
Reno.z°4 The Allison court also ruled that plaintiffs who accept an
offer of judgment are eligible for an award of attorney fees as prevail-
ing parties if another statute20 5 authorizes such an award.20 6 Gaston v.
Tillery2 0 7 was concerned with the effect of a plaintiff's rejection of an
offer of judgment when the amount of the judgment is less than the
offer. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was liable to the
defendant for the defendant's costs incurred after the making of the
offer of judgment, but the plaintiff was entitled to recover those costs
that were incurred before the offer of judgment was made.208
The next section summarizes a number of decisions dealing with
appellate procedure. None of them announced any new principles,
but several are helpful in clarifying the recently enacted Oklahoma
Judgments and Appeals Act.
V. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A number of cases addressed the timing of appeals under the
Oklahoma Judgment Act, which went into effect on October 1, 1993.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has consistently ruled that since the
effective date of the Oklahoma Judgments and Appeals Act, the filing
of a court minute order does not trigger the thirty-day time limit for
filing a petition. An example is Corbit v. Williams. 0 9 Relying on ex-
press language in section 692.2(C) of title 12210 that a minute entry is
not a judgment, decree or appealable order, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that its filing did not commence the period for fling a peti-
tion in error and therefore it dismissed the appeal as premature.2 1 '
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also ruled in Manning v. State ex rel.
Department of Public Safety,212 however, that a minute order ified
203. Id. at 87-88.
204. 894 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
205. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 940(A) (1991).
206. Allison, 894 P.2d at 1137.
207. 900 P.2d 1012 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
208. Id. at 1013-14.
209. 897 P.2d 1129 (Okla. 1995).
210. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 692.2(C) (Supp. 1995).
211. Corbit, 897 P.2d at 1131-32.
212. 876 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1994).
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before October 1, 1993, can constitute an appealable order or judg-
ment if it fully adjudicated the rights of the parties. The Manning de-
cision has little practical significance because it has been given only
prospective effect and therefore would apply only to orders issued af-
ter June 7, 1994.213 Minute orders issued after June 7, 1994 would not
be appealable, however, since they would come under the Oklahoma
Judgments and Appeals Act.214
Besides complying with the formal requirements of section
692.2(C), a judgment must also express a final determination of the
rights of the parties. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled in Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse2l5 that an order stating
that "the Court finds that the motions should be overruled" was not
sufficient to constitute a final appealable order. Instead, the order
should have stated that "the motions are overruled. ' 216 In addition,
the Supreme Court determined in McMillian v. Holcomb2 1 7 that an
order containing a direction to the prevailing party to prepare a jour-
nal entry or judgment is not a judgment for the purposes of commenc-
ing an appeal.
The time to appeal is extended by the filing of a timely post-trial
motion, such as a motion for new trial. In Brown v. Green Country
Softball Ass'n ,21 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a motion for
new trial did not extend the time for appeal because it was filed before
the judgment was filed. The Supreme Court gave its ruling only pro-
spective effect, however.219 Moreover, a 1994 amendment to section
653 of title 1210 eliminated the procedural trap that was highlighted
by the Brown case by allowing motions for new trial to be effective if
they are fied after the trial court's pronouncement but before the fil-
ing of the judgment.22
In contrast to a motion for new trial, a motion to vacate a judg-
ment does not extend the time to appeal. The difference between a
motion for new trial and a motion to vacate a judgment for appellate
procedure purposes is in the timing; a post-trial motion filed within
213. See Meadows v. Pittsburg Bd. of City Comm'rs, 898 P.2d 741 (Okla. 1995); Lucas v.
Bishop, 890 P.2d 411, 412 (Okla. 1995); In re Estate of Robinson, 885 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Okla.
1994).
214. See Corbit, 897 P.2d at 1131.
215. 885 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1994).
216. Id. at 1357-58.
217. 907 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Okla. 1995).
218. 884 P.2d 851, 852 (Okla. 1994).
219. Brown, 884 P.2d at 853; McMillian, 907 P.2d at 1037.
220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 653 (Supp. 1994).
221. Brown, 884 P.2d at 852.
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ten days of the filing of the judgment is treated as a motion for new
trial, and a post-trial motion filed more than ten days after the filing of
a judgment is treated as a motion to vacate.' Although the filing of
a motion to vacate does not extend the time to appeal from a judg-
ment, the denial of a motion to vacate constitutes a final order and it
may be appealed through the filing of a petition in error within thirty
days of the filing of the motion to vacate.22
Similarly, the filing of a motion for costs, attorney fees, or interest
does not extend the time to appeal.2 4 An order awarding or denying
costs, attorney fees, or interest will be a final order, though, and it is
reviewed through the filing of a petition in error within thirty days of
the filing of the order .1 5 An appeal from a judgment will generally
not suffice for obtaining review of a subsequent award of attorney
fees." 6 However, if the underlying judgment is reversed, an award of
attorney's fees based on a party's having prevailed at trial would have
to be vacated?2 7
The procedure for applying for attorney's fees for services per-
formed on appeal was clarified by an amendment to section 696.4 of
title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.2 A party may apply for attorney's
fees at any time before issuance of mandate and may make the re-
quest either in the brief on appeal or by a separate motion. The ap-
pellate court decides whether to award the attorney's fees, but the
trial court determines the amount, and the trial court's determination
is an appealable order.229
In order for a petition in error to be timely filed, it must either be
received by the Oklahoma Supreme Court or sent by certified mail,
return receipt requested, within thirty days of the filing of the judg-
ment. In Rusk v. Independent School District No. 11 ° the appeal was
dismissed as untimely because the petition in error was sent by prior-
ity mail rather than certified mail, and it unfortunately did not arrive
at the Supreme Court until the thirty-day period had expired.
222. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.2 (Supp. 1995).
223. See Peoria Corp. v. Lemay, 895 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Okla. 1994) (appeal was limited to the
denial of the petition to vacate the judgment).
224. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.2(D) (Supp. 1995).
225. Keel v. Wright, 890 P.2d 1351,1354 (Okla. 1995) (petition in error was timely filed with
respect to attorney fees award but not as to underlying judgment).
226. See Thompson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 94, 886 P.2d 996, 997 (Okla. 1994) (no
timely appeal from order awarding attorney's fees).
227. Id. at 998.
228. See 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 253, § 1.
229. Id.
230. 885 P.2d 1365 (Okla. 1994).
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The past year has seen a variety of significant developments in
Oklahoma civil procedure. The most noteworthy is the new Tort Re-
form Law. The Tort Reform Law extends Oklahoma's prior offer of
judgment procedure beyond costs to include attorney fees, adopts a
three-tiered system to govern the award of punitive damages in tort
cases, and provides immunity for volunteers. Whether the offer of
judgment procedure will be utilized to a greater extent than it was in
the past remains to be seen because of the $100,000 minimum offer
requirement for personal injury and similar cases. The new system for
punitive damages awards is more complex than the prior procedure,
and this may make it more difficult for trial judges and juries to apply
correctly. It does promote clarity, though, by specifying standards for
the jury to use in determining the amount of punitive damages
awards, and it provides somewhat greater control over juries. Com-
pared to the Tort Reform Law, the case law developments in the past
year relating to civil procedure were relatively modest, but they did
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